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APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Akhil Reed Amar* 
“Houston” is the first word of today’s Address—as it was the 
first word ever spoken on the lunar surface. 
This city, the moon, and the specific topic of today’s 
Address—the Twenty-fifth Amendment—are interconnected. Let 
me begin by tracing these interconnections. With apologies to Neil 
Armstrong, I will need to take more than “one small step,” but not 
much more. When Apollo 11 touched down on the moon, Neil 
Armstrong immediately relayed the news: “Houston, Tranquility 
Base here. The Eagle has landed.”1 The NASA program had 
achieved its amazing objective of landing a man on the moon in 
the decade of the 1960s—an objective defined in 1961 by President 
John Kennedy and pursued after Kennedy’s death by his Vice-
President-turned-President, Lyndon Johnson. The two NASA 
space centers at the heart of this amazing project bear the names 
of these two Presidents: the Kennedy Space Center in Florida and 
the Johnson Space Center here in Houston. These extraordinary 
space centers, however, are hardly the only legacy of the Kennedy-
Johnson years. The very transition from Kennedy to Johnson, a 
transition occasioned by the shocking events in another Texas city, 
precipitated a constitutional amendment in 1967 aimed at 
smoothing out the wrinkles in the constitutional fabric of 
presidential succession.2 That amendment provides the main topic 
for today’s Address. 
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In what follows, I shall collect and comment upon public 
statements I have made in the last dozen years about how the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment might be used creatively to better 
manage various high-stakes situations that might arise or that 
have already arisen. 
At the outset, let me offer a few quick words about the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment’s basic structure. Section 1 of the 
Amendment makes clear that when a President dies, resigns, or is 
removed (via the impeachment process), the Vice President 
officially becomes “President” with all the powers, duties, and 
privileges of that office.3 Section 2 of the Amendment provides that 
when a vice-presidential vacancy arises—either because the Vice 
President has become President under Section 1, or because the 
Vice President himself has died, resigned, or been removed—the 
sitting President may fill the vacancy by nominating a new Vice 
President who will take office upon confirmation by the full 
Congress.4 Section 3 establishes procedures under which a 
President may declare himself “unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office” and thereby temporarily transfer 
presidential power to the Vice President until the President acts 
to recover his powers, under procedures also provided in 
Section 3.5 Section 4 outlines procedures by which the Vice 
President may assume the powers of “Acting President” in 
situations where the President is “unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office” but has not himself transferred 
power under Section 3.6  
In early 1999, as the nation was experiencing the first 
impeachment of an elected President in its history, I floated the 
suggestion that Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment need not 
be limited to cases in which the President found himself 
physically or mentally “unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office.” Instead, I argued, the Amendment enabled him to 
also proclaim himself, in effect, politically unable to act as 
President—and in such a situation, enabled him to transfer 
presidential power, temporarily, to his hand-picked vice-
presidential running mate. Far from a sign of weakness, this self-
abnegation could, I argued, actually strengthen a President’s 
hand in certain situations. (Anyone who fails to understand that 
power may sometimes be augmented even while power is 
seemingly being relinquished should study with care Marbury v. 
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Madison.) Here is what I wrote for the February 8, 1999, issue of 
the New Republic:7 
Bill Clintons grip on power is so fierce, say his critics, that 
prying him from office would require a device even more powerful 
than the jaws of lifethe contraption fire-rescue teams use to 
extract victims of car accidents from twisted metal wreckage. But 
suppose Clinton were to confound his detractors and actually do 
something noble: step down from office, temporarily, until the 
end of his impeachment trial. What would be the constitutional 
and political implications of this unprecedented reaction to an 
unprecedented impeachment of a duly elected President? (Recall 
that Andrew Johnson, Abraham Lincolns Vice President, became 
President not via all mens ballots but because of one mans 
bullet.) 
The constitutional mechanism enabling Clinton to step 
aside, temporarily, is elaborated in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 
adopted in the wake of President Kennedys assassination. Under 
Section 3 of this Amendment, Whenever the President 
transmits . . . his written declaration that he is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he 
transmits . . . a written declaration to the contrary, such powers 
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting 
President. Note that the inability here need not be physical. 
Clinton could simply say that, during the pendency of his trial, 
he deems it politically and morally better for the country that the 
high powers of the presidency be wielded by someone who is not 
under any cloud, and that he will retake the office only once the 
cloud has lifted, upon his due acquittal by the Senate. Legally, 
Clinton would be free at any time to take back the reins of 
powerbut his pledge not to do so until the end of the trial 
would, as a practical matter, make it hard for him to renege. 
Clinton could have stepped down a while ago, of course. But, 
before January 20 of this year, any such move by Clinton would 
not have been very sporting to his loyal Vice President, Al Gore. 
January 20 marks the exact midpoint of Clintons second term, 
which began at noon on January 20, 1997, in keeping with the 
constitutional calendar mandated by the Twentieth Amendment. 
Under the Twenty-second Amendment, adopted after FDRs 
unprecedented tenure in office, No person shall be elected to the 
office of the President more than twice, and no person who has 
held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than 
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two years of a term to which some other person was elected 
President shall be elected to the office of the President more than 
once. If Clinton had stepped aside before January 20, and if he 
were eventually to be convicted in the Senate, President Gore 
would have been limited to a maximum possible tenure of six 
years in officeeligible to run in 2000, but not in 2004. But, if 
Clinton steps down any time from now on, Gore would be allowed 
to serve out the remainder of Clintons term and would still be 
able to run for two terms in his own right. 
Far from an act of disloyaltyturning Gore into a premature 
lame duckany temporary transfer of power from Clinton to 
Gore henceforth would be an act of great fidelity and fealty to his 
number two, a dramatic endorsement by Clinton of Gore as a 
worthy occupant of the Oval Office. 
And whats in it for Clinton? Just possibly the recovery of his 
honor and a shot at redemption. Stepping aside temporarily 
would be a penance he imposed on himself rather than a penalty 
forced upon him by others. Too often, his concessions thus far 
have come just one step ahead of the law. He admitted the truth 
about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky only after the DNA 
results proved that his past statements were lies; he proposed 
censure only to fend off impeachment; he mouthed words of 
contrition without really exhaling. The time to make concessions 
and show contrition is when you are winningand in that sense 
now is the most opportune moment since the scandal broke, 
because it seems clear that, if he stands pat, he will win in the 
Senate. (Indeed, the ideal time to be a little self-sacrificing would 
be now, in the wake of his post-State of the Union bounce.) 
Yes, by stepping aside temporarily, he imperils his 
presidencyhe utterly unsettles matters and risks losing all. But 
it is precisely this willingness to take the risk of losing what he 
lovespowerthat may help redeem him in the eyes of his 
countrymen and history. If he declines to step down, odds are 
that he will win in the Senate and stay in officebut he may 
well win by losing, because his acquittal would come after a 
simple majority of the Senate voted to oust him, rather than two-
thirds. Will he be able to lead after this, or will he just mark 
time? Wont any victory in the Senate taste sour unless he can 
somehow bring a measure of nobility back to himself and his 
office? 
By contrast, if he wins in the Senate after stepping down
sacrificing himself and making it easier to vote against himany 
acquittal would seem a more genuine vindication, a more 
dramatic rebirth. Given that some Republican senators may be 
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tempted to vote against him knowing that their votes wont 
suffice, Clinton could even say that, unless an absolute Senate 
majority votes to acquit, he will not return; if he wins this high-
stakes gamble, he wins with genuine credibility and a true vote 
of confidence. True, any offer to step down permanently if a 
majority votes against him risks sliding our separated-powers 
system toward British-style parliamentarianism, but, with 
impeachment under way, that specter is already upon us. With a 
bold move, Clinton might actually enhance the presidency by 
seizing moral high ground and redefining himself rather than 
letting others define him. 
Now consider Al Gore. The biggest structural problem of the 
vice presidency is that its occupant lacks a personal mandate 
from the people. In many states, voters cast separate ballots for 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor (not to mention other 
statewide offices like attorney general), but in no state do citizens 
vote separately for the national vice presidency.8 A Vice 
President is merely the bottom half of a presidential ticket, and 
most voters pay no attention to this office, focusing only on the 
top of the ticket. (Pop quiz: Name Ross Perots 1992 and 1996 
running mates.) In short, Americans vote for President, and the 
Vice President simply piggybacks into office. The Constitution 
does not require this perverse way of picking Vice Presidents, but 
most of the time it is harmless. However, when something 
happens to the President, and the Vice President must take over 
temporarily or permanently, our weird electoral system creates a 
legitimacy gap because we end up with a chief executive no one 
squarely voted for. The problem is compounded by ticket 
balancing, when Americans vote for the avatar of one wing of a 
party and end up with a representative of the other wing. (Think 
about Lincoln and Johnson, or James Garfield and Chester 
Arthur, or William McKinley and Teddy Roosevelt.) 
If Clinton were to stand pat now and ultimately be 
convicted, the transition to Gore would be awkwardall the 
more so because no one really expects it to happen, even at this 
late date. But, if Clinton were to temporarily step down now and 
then be convicted the transition to Gore would be smoother 
because Gore would already be in place, installed with a personal 
and unforced vote of confidence from Clinton himself when it 
counted. Conversely, if Clinton were ultimately acquitted, Gore 
would have had a chance to prove his presidential mettleas the 
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de jure acting President of the United Statesin the most 
dramatic way imaginable. 
Finally, consider the Senate. In keeping with the command 
of Article I, Section 3, each senator has taken an oath to do 
impartial justice. One meaning of such an oath is that each 
senator should be impartisanutterly inattentive to the 
demands of political party. A Republican senator should imagine 
herself to be a Democrat, and a Democratic senator should 
imagine himself to be a Republican. But this is hard to do 
psychologically, and pundits are predicting that the eventual vote 
in the Senate may well break down cleanly along party lines. 
If so, this might be greatly disheartening to the nation. But 
having Al Gore physically occupying the Oval Office during the 
remainder of the trial might wonderfully concentrate the minds 
of the senators and confound perceptions of partisanship. If 
Republicans vote to convict and Democrats vote to acquit, it will 
be more clear to Americans that this is not necessarily pure 
partisanship at play. Pro-conviction Republicans, after all, would 
be voting in the most emphatic way to keep Al Gore in the White 
Houseand immeasurably strengthen him for a bid in 2000. 
Conversely, pro-acquittal Democrats would be seen as weakening 
their presidential prospects for 2000 in order to affirm their 
sincerely held view that Clinton was duly elected and has 
suffered enough. 
In short, by stepping down temporarily, Bill Clinton could 
step up morally and politically, in a way that would benefit the 
vice presidency, the Senate, the country, and even himself. Dont 
hold your breathbut keep in mind that the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment offers creative opportunities for the comeback kid to 
find a place to come back from. 
*  *  * 
For some strange reason, President Clinton declined to take 
my unsolicited and unconventional advice to relinquish power. 
But at least one aspect of my 1999 article did portend the future: 
Al Gore did go on to win his party’s nomination for the 
presidency—as have roughly half of the vice presidents in the 
aftermath of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. (For most of American 
history, a very different pattern played out: From 1804 to 1952, 
less than 15% of vice presidents ever went on to bear their party’s 
standard as a presidential nominee.9) As the Bush–Gore 2000 
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election approached, I had a hunch that something weird might 
be about to happen. True, I didn’t precisely predict the fiasco of 
Florida. But in a pair of pre-election pieces published in Slate, I 
did worry aloud that the popular vote winner might well lose the 
Electoral College vote. I also raised some questions about a rather 
large hole in the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s safety net: The 
Amendment says nothing about how election law should handle 
the death or disability of a major presidential candidate shortly 
before Election Day. 
Here is what I posted on October 21, 2000:10 
A plane crashes or a ship sinks or a tire blows. We 
immediately ask how this happened and how future disasters 
might be prevented. Yet we do not ask similar questions when 
our election system suffers a near miss. In the wake of Mondays 
death of Missouri Governor and U.S. Senate candidate Mel 
Carnahan, only three weeks before Election Day, we should re-
examine our presidential election system. On close inspection, it 
is a series of accidents waiting to happen. 
Imagine, God forbid, that on the eve of the election, a 
presidential candidate dies or becomes incapacitated. Federal 
law mandates that all states choose their electors on the first 
Tuesday after November 1. But if tragedy strikes in late October 
or early November, there will be insufficient time for the 
American people to process the tragedy and ponder their 
remaining electoral options. 
National law fixes Election Day, but a patchwork of state 
laws regulates ballot access and counting. Most states would allow 
the national parties to designate new candidates, but in some 
election-eve scenarios, there might not be time for parties to 
deliberate properly before America votes. New ballots would need 
to be printed and absentee ballots revised. All this takes time. 
Without some postponement, voters might not even be sure 
for whom they are voting or how their votes will be counted by 
party leaders, state officials, and Congress (which officially counts 
Electoral College votes). Suppose that Smith is running for 
President with Jones as his vice-presidential running mate. If 
Smith dies in early November, will a vote for the SmithJones 
ticket be counted as, in effect, a vote for Jones as President? Under 
current statutes, precedents, and party policies, the issue is far 
from clearbut voters are entitled to know the answers before 
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they cast their votes. Moreover, under current law in many states, 
if 46% vote for SmithJones and 5% write in Jones, election 
officials would not add these votes together. Jones might lose the 
state even though 51% of the voters clearly picked him. This oddity 
arises because many states count votes by presidentialvice-
presidential ticket rather than directly by presidential candidate.11 
The importance of tickets creates further complications. 
Even if a party quickly converges on a new presidential nominee 
by elevating its vice-presidential candidate to the top spot, it will 
then need to fill the bottom spot. This will require vetting 
possible nominees. It, too, will take time to be done right. Things 
become even trickier if party leaders decide that the former vice-
presidential nomineeperhaps a ticket-balancing sop to the 
partys losing wingshould not top the new ticket. 
Unlike some European regimes, Americans vote for persons, 
not parties. Our votes for the presidency are among our most 
personal votes: For this officeunlike, perhaps, all others in our 
systemvoters should never be asked to sign some blank check 
or endorse some blank slate with the bland promise that after the 
election, some party committee will sort everything out and tell 
them whom they ended up voting for. We the voters need time to 
focus on the new presidential candidatestheir names, their 
lives, their personal visionsand gain a comfort level with them 
before we cast our votes. With so much riding on the presidency 
domestically and internationallyand with no real chance for 
the people to correct a mistake until four long years have 
elapsedwe deserve an electoral endgame that reflects popular 
deliberation and choice, not grief and confusion. 
To avert democratic train wrecks in future elections, we 
must change current laws. A sensible federal statute should 
provide that, in the event of autumn death or incapacity of a 
major presidential or vice-presidential candidateas certified by 
the Chief Justicethe federal election date should be postponed 
by up to a month, allowing the necessary democratic 
deliberations to unfold properly. Each state should decide in 
advance whether it will postpone its statewide elections to 
coordinate with the delayed federal election or whether it prefers 
to hold two electionsthe first in November for state races and 
the second a few weeks later for federal officials. 
Election-eve deaths are not the only democratic accidents 
waiting to happen. If a winning candidate dies after the election 
                                                          
 11. See Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 8, at 92627 (illustrating the 
result of counting ticket votes rather than individual votes for candidates). 
(1) AMAR 3/20/2010 1:37:16 PM 
2010] THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 9 
but before the Electoral College meets, some state laws would 
apparently require electoral collegians to vote for him (with his 
running mate presumably taking office in January), but 
Congress, following a musty precedent, might well refuse to 
count these votes. After losing to Ulysses Grant in November 
1872, presidential candidate Horace Greeley promptly died, but 
some electors from states that he carried in November 
nevertheless voted for him; Congress refused to treat these votes 
as valid. In Greeleys case, little turned on the issueGrant had 
won the electionbut the matter would be quite different if the 
Greeley precedent were extended so as to ignore a dead winners 
votes and thus snatch the crown from his running mate. Once 
again, the peoples will on Election Day might be thwarted by odd 
glitches that could easily be cured in advance by a clarifying 
statute enacted before any actual death occurs.12 
Another democratic nightmare: If something were to happen 
to both President Clinton and Vice President Gore, current law 
would name Representative Dennis Hastert as Presidentand 
after him the nonagenarian Senator Strom Thurmondeven 
though the American people in 1996 voted to give the Oval Office 
to Democrats, not Republicans. Indeed, there are compelling 
reasons to think that the current succession statute is itself 
unconstitutional: The Constitution gives Congress the power to 
pick which Cabinet officer may move into a vacant Oval Office, in 
effect enabling the President to name both his vice-presidential 
running mate and his backup Cabinet successor.13 But Congress 
in 1947 unconstitutionally and unwisely switched away from 
Cabinet succession by putting congressional baronsthe Speaker 
of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senatefirst 
in line, ahead of the Secretaries of State and Defense. 
Last but not least of the democratic accidents waiting to 
happen: The man who loses the national popular vote next month 
might nonetheless win the electoral vote. If it doesnt happen 
next month, one day, statistically, it will. When it does, will the 
loserwinner have the requisite democratic legitimacy at home 
and abroad? If not, why are we waiting for this tire to blow 
rather than acting, via constitutional amendment, to fix the 
system before it crashes? 
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*  *  * 
And here is what I posted on November 2, 2000:14 
President Strom Thurmond? Dont laugh. The odds are against 
it, but there is an outside chance of constitutional meltdown in the 
days ahead. The problem is created by the Constitutions archaic 
and confusing rules concerning the Electoral College and its 
intricate provisions concerning Oval Office vacancies. 
Constitutionally, the key next Tuesday is not who wins the 
nationwide popular vote, but who wins the state-by-state 
electoral vote. Americans will pick 538 electors, and to win, a 
candidate needs an absolute majority: 270. 
But what if Bush and Gore tie at 269 apiece? This is not a 
fanciful scenario. For example, imagine that Gore wins the 
following states where he seems clearly or slightly ahead today: 
California (54 electoral votes), New York (33), Florida (25), 
Pennsylvania (23), Illinois (22), Michigan (18), New Jersey (15), 
Massachusetts (12), Washington (11), Wisconsin (11), Maryland 
(10), Minnesota (10), Connecticut (8), Hawaii (4), Rhode Island 
(4), District of Columbia (3), Delaware (3), and Vermont (3). If 
Bush wins everywhere else, each man would have 269 electoral 
votes. Several other easily imaginable permutations could yield 
the same 269269 tie. 
In this event, our Constitution and statutes allow the race to 
be decided in the incoming House of Representatives. But in this 
vote, each state must vote as a bloc, and the winner must win an 
absolute majority of statestwenty-six out of fifty. Some state 
delegations, however, are likely to be evenly divided between 
Republicans and Democrats. If each of these delegations could 
cast a half vote for each man, then one candidate could likely 
emerge victorious. But the Constitution says that each state shall 
have one vote and says nothing about half votes. House rules 
and House precedents from the elections of 18001801 and 1824
1825 (the only times the House has picked the President), 
disallow half votes. Thus, divided delegations probably wont 
count, and neither Bush nor Gore might be able to reach the 
magic number of twenty-six. 
So, what happens then? The presidency would appear to 
stand vacant after noon on January 20. The Constitution says 
that the Vice President should then take over. But who will be 
Vice President after January 20? 
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If Bush and Gore tie at 269, so will Cheney and Lieberman. 
In this event, the Twelfth Amendment provides that the Senate 
shall pick between them and that the winner must get an 
absolute majorityfifty-one votes. Here, all bets are off. Imagine 
the scenarios: 
President Lieberman? If the Democrats manage to win every 
tight race, the new Senate could be evenly split. The Senates 
presiding officer (until January 20) is none other than Vice 
President Al Gore, and he could cast the tie-breaking vote for 
Lieberman. Lieberman might possibly be free to later nominate 
Gore as his Vice President under the Twenty-fifth Amendment 
and then step down once Gore was confirmed, though there are 
serious unresolved questions here.15 
President Cheney? If Republicans hold on to the Senate, 
then they could pick Cheney (who in turn might be able to 
eventually switch positions with Bush under the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment). 
President Hastert? If the Senate splits down the middle, it is 
not completely clear that the Vice President may cast a tie-
breaking vote under the Twelfth Amendment. Arguably the 
Amendment requires an absolute majority of senators, and 
technically Gore is not a senator. If neither side has fifty-one 
senators, federal succession laws could make the Speaker of the 
House the acting President. Republican Dennis Hastert currently 
holds the speakership and will likely retain it if the Republicans 
keep control of the House in Tuesdays congressional elections. 
President Gephardt? If the Democrats win back the House 
on Tuesday, the new Speaker might be Richard Gephardt rather 
than Dennis Hastert. 
President Thurmond? If the House elections turn out to be 
very close, the House could be without a Speaker at the 
beginning of the session. (This happened repeatedly in the 
nineteenth century.) Next in line under the succession law is the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, the nonagenerian South 
Carolina Republican, Strom Thurmond. If Republicans win back 
the Senate, 5149, Thurmond could conceivably, by declining to 
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vote for Cheney and thus denying Cheney the needed fifty-one 
votes, crown himself king. 
President Albright? The presidential succession laws 
currently in place probably violate the Constitution. Only 
Officers of the United States may be picked as presidential 
successors, and senators and representatives are not such 
officers, properly speaking.16 The next person on the statutory 
succession list is the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. Our 
first woman President! 
But wait. Albright was not born in the United States,17 so 
she is ineligible. Next in line is Secretary of the Treasury Larry 
Summers. 
There is a lesson in all this head-spinning speculation: Our 
current systems of presidential selection and succession are a 
messvarious accidents and crises waiting to happen. Why not 
amend the Constitution and provide for direct popular election 
for all future presidential contests? 
*  *  * 
Although the Bush–Gore election did not end up in the exact 
sort of train wreck that I had imagined, the Florida mess was 
pretty ugly and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore18 
was uglier still. I have set forth my criticisms of the Court 
elsewhere.19 Today, I add only that in the days after the Court 
stopped the recount and handed the election to George W. Bush, I 
thought to myself that Bill Clinton should have used the Twenty-
fifth Amendment to deliver a poetic rebuke to the Court and a 
fitting consolation prize to Gore. Clinton could have easily done so 
by resigning under Section 1 of the Amendment and thereby 
making Al Gore the President of the United States for at least a 
day or perhaps a month prior to Bush’s inauguration. (Careful 
observers will of course note that I had urged something similar, 
via Section 2, in 1999.) Had Clinton resigned after Bush v. Gore 
and had Gore later sought a rematch against Bush in 2004, it 
would have been a contest among true equals—between two true 
Presidents of the United States. But, as we have already seen, Bill 
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Clinton was not one to walk away from power lightly—even to do 
the right thing by his loyal “veep.” 
The next major event to prompt me to think again about the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment was that terrible day in September 
2001. The prospect of possible pre-election mayhem seemed even 
more vivid to me than it had been the previous fall, and once 
again it struck me that the Twenty-fifth Amendment had no 
comprehensive provisions to address the election law issues raised 
by the specter of terrorism aimed at the heart of the American 
presidential election system. Here is what I wrote in the 
Washington Post on the two-month anniversary of 9/11:20 
A year ago this month, a freakishly close presidential 
election focused Americans attention on the glitches of election 
codes and voting machines and spurred talk of election reform. 
Now, different images haunt our imagination, and anti-terrorism 
legislation is the order of the day. It is not much of a stretch to 
imagine that future terrorists might target the very foundations 
of our democracythe elections themselves. 
Election reform, meet anti-terrorism legislation. 
Over the past year, more than 1,500 election bills have been 
introduced in legislatures across America proposing fixes for 
what had gone wrong in the pasteverything from modernizing 
tabulation technology to repealing the Electoral College and 
making Election Day a national holiday. And then the terrorists 
struck. 
Our new awareness of the possibility of terrorism brings into 
focus a set of problems that have shadowed our voting system for 
decades. Natural disasters can compromise elections, as can a 
candidates election-eve death or incapacitation, whether from 
natural causes or assassination. If tragedy were to strike in late 
October or early November, would voters be able to weigh their 
remaining electoral options? The fallout could be far more 
destabilizing than the few weeks of uncertainty we lived through 
last year. 
Think back for a moment to the reason September 11 was a 
specially marked date on New Yorkers calendars: It was a local 
election day, with contests that included the citys mayoral 
primary. As the horrific events unfolded, Governor George Pataki 
understood that an orderly and democratically satisfactory 
election that day was impossible. State law allowed him to 
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postpone the balloting. But current federal law does not permit a 
similar delay of congressional and presidential elections. The law 
mandates an election on the first Tuesday after November 1, 
come hell or high water, terror or trauma.21 
So suppose that a major presidential or vice-presidential 
candidate dies or is incapacitated shortly before Election Day. A 
patchwork of state laws governs ballot access and counting, and 
most states allow national parties to substitute new candidates. 
But in some situations, parties would lack time to deliberate and 
state officials would lack time to print revised ballots. Without 
some postponement, voters might not even know whom they 
were really voting for. If presidential candidate Smith died, 
would a vote for Smith be counted as a vote for his or her vice-
presidential running mate Jones, or for some player to be named 
later by a conclave of party bigwigs? 
An issue of this kind arose last year in Missouri. U.S. Senate 
candidate Mel Carnahan died in mid-October, but voters 
nevertheless elected him in November in the expectation that his 
wife, Jean Carnahan, would be installed in his stead. She was. 
But had he died closer to the election or had the loserthen-
Senator John Ashcroftbeen less gracious and more litigious, 
Missouri might have been almost as tumultuous as Florida last 
December. 
The 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
spurred reformers to enact the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which 
streamlined issues of vice-presidential succession. But the 
assassination five years later of the late Presidents brother
presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedyfailed to prompt 
comparable reform to address the death or disability of 
presidential candidates. Indeed, had RFK been shot hours before 
the general election rather than hours after the California 
primary, the vulnerability of the current system would have been 
obvious to alland would likely have prompted serious 
discussion of election-postponement legislation. 
Election reform to protect against such dramatic assaults 
will require hard choices. The tight timetable we now have was 
created by the Twentieth Amendment in 1933 to shrink the lame 
duck period between a Presidents election and inauguration. The 
idea was that an incumbent President should yield as quickly as 
possibleon January 20 to be preciseto a new President with a 
fresh electoral mandate. But shortening that period any further 
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would not only leave less time for counting, recounting, and 
resolving any complaints that arise, it would also make it harder 
for the eventual winner to assemble his new administration 
before inauguration. (Last years shortened transition period 
surely complicated life for George W. Bush.) 
One option would be for federal law to move the federal 
Election Day to October, with provision for postponement in rare 
circumstances. This, of course, would widen the very gap between 
election and inauguration that the Twentieth Amendment sought 
to shrink. A better response would thus be to keep Election Day 
as is, but allow brief postponement in rare circumstances, with 
streamlined voting technology, statutes, and court procedures to 
ensure enough time for proper counts and recounts. 
A sound reform law might also allow for the postponement of 
the Electoral College meeting. State laws often purport to bind 
electors to vote for the candidate who won the states popular 
vote, but what if this candidate has died or become disabled 
between Election Day and the day of the meeting? 
This actually happened in 1872, when Democrat Horace 
Greeley died shortly after losing to incumbent Ulysses S. Grant. 
Some loyal electors voted as pledgedfor the dead manand 
Congress later disregarded their votes. Little turned on 
Congresss ruling, given that Greeley had clearly lost in 
November. Had he won, however, surely the fairest result would 
have been to credit his electoral votes to his running mate. 
Otherwise, the party that won the presidency on Election Day 
could conceivably lose it before the inauguration. But Congress in 
1873 simply tossed Greeleys votes aside, and that precedent 
remains a source of potential mischief today. Like ordinary 
voters, electors should understand in advance whether and how 
their votes will be counted and should be able to cast these votes in 
an atmosphere of calm deliberation. And that may mean allowing 
for the postponement of the Electoral College meeting in a crisis. 
The question remains of howand by whoma postponement 
should be triggered. Handing this power to the Chief Justice 
risks sucking the Supreme Court into partisan politics, the danger 
of which is well illustrated by last years controversy surrounding 
Bush v. Gore. The current Federal Election Commission may 
likewise lack the necessary credibility and impartiality. One 
possibility would be to let each major party (defined as the top 
two vote-getters in the previous election) trigger a postponement 
upon request. Parties would hesitate to delay elections for 
frivolous or partisan reasons because the voters could 
immediately punish any postponements seen as gamesmanship. 
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A final issue is whether, in an emergency, to postpone all 
federal elections or simply the presidential one. Once again, a 
law could be drafted to specify the decisionmaker and vest that 
person with considerable discretion. Because federal law controls 
only federal elections, each state would decide whether to 
postpone elections for state officers so as to coordinate with the 
delayed federal election or whether instead to hold two elections 
in short order for state and federal officers, respectively. 
However all these wrinkles are ironed out, the experiences of 
this past year have made it clear that election reform proposals 
cannot afford to focus exclusively on fixing the problems of the 
past. Our democratic processes need to be protected from much 
less predictable threats. 
*  *  * 
The careful observer will detect in my November 2001 piece at 
least two shifts in my thinking compared to my earlier musings. 
First, the Florida fiasco had made me more conscious of the 
difficulty of postponing elections while also reserving enough 
time for careful recounting. Second, after witnessing the Supreme 
Court’s jaw-dropping performance in Bush v. Gore, I was 
somewhat less enthusiastic about making the Chief Justice the 
pivotal decisionmaker in regards to electoral postponement. 
Once again, however, the political powers that be did not 
seem particularly interested in pursuing my advice. But 
academics are nothing if not persistent. And when life hands you 
colonoscopies, make use of the moment! So when, in June 2002, 
President George W. Bush underwent a scheduled colonoscopy, 
during which time he actually invoked Section 3 of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment to temporarily transfer presidential power to 
Vice President Dick Cheney, I thought the time was yet again ripe 
to try to persuade my fellow citizens to think more generally about 
the Amendment and other problems that this Amendment could 
be used to solve. The result was a two-part essay that my 
sometime co-author (and fulltime brother) Vikram David Amar 
and I published on Findlaw.com. Here is Part I, which we posted 
on July 26, 2002:22 
For a couple of hours in late June, Vice President Dick 
Cheney became the acting President of the United States, as 
George W. Bush underwent anesthesia for a scheduled medical 
procedure. The smooth handoff of presidential power from Bush 
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to Cheney and back to Bush occurred pursuant to the 
Constitutions Twenty-fifth Amendment, which provides a 
detailed framework regulating various sorts of presidential 
disability. 
But this Amendment did not become part of the Constitution 
until 1967. Why did it take Americans nearly two centuries to 
clarify something so important? The unsettling answer is that 
both the Framers and later generations of Americans gave rather 
little thought to the vice presidency and certain specific issues 
involving the transfer of executive power. The very idea of a vice 
presidency was dreamed up in the closing days of the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, and its chief value was as one 
cog in an intricate Electoral College contraption regulating 
presidential elections. 
Delegates worried that after George Washington left the 
political scene, each state might simply cast all its electoral votes 
for its own favorite son. But then this scattering of electoral votes 
would deny any one candidate a majority and thus, throw every 
presidential election into Congress, in which case the Executive 
might become overly dependent on the Legislature. The 
Philadelphia delegates ingenious solution was to require each 
state to vote for two persons, one of whom must be an out-of-
stater. This rule would give a boost to national candidates
respected statesmen who might be everyones second choice after 
the local favorite son. And to discourage states from gaming the 
system by wasting their second (out-of-state) votethereby 
cycling back to a fractured world of favorite sonsthe Framers 
created an office called the Vice President and provided that this 
office would go to the runner-up in the presidential race. Thus 
states would have strong incentives to take their second (out-of-
state) vote seriously. 
When Elbridge Gerry (who, ironically enough, would one day 
serve as Vice President) complained about this odd office and 
proposed eliminating it, another delegate candidly responded 
that such an officer as the vice-President was not wanted. He 
was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election 
which required two to be chosen at the same time. 
In light of this history, it is hardly surprising that the 
Founders Constitution neglected to specify certain critical details 
concerning the vice presidency and its relationship to the 
presidency itself. 
The original Electoral College system quickly collapsed once 
national presidential parties and informal presidential-vice-
presidential tickets began to emerge. After the Adams-Jefferson-
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Burr election of 18001801, the Electoral College was revised by 
the Twelfth Amendment, which directed states to cast separate 
votes for the President and the Vice President. But even the 
Twelfth Amendment focused far more on the presidency than on 
the number two slot. Indeed, critics predicted that the 
Amendment would diminish the quality of future vice presidents, 
who would no longer be major presidential candidates in their 
own right, but merely second-fiddles to party leaders. 
This criticism proved prescient. So long as presidents 
stayed healthy in officeas did the first eight presidents 
spanning the Constitutions first half centurythe vice 
presidency received rather little attention. Indeed, for much of 
American historyaround thirty-seven of the Constitutions 
first 180 yearsthe country did without a Vice President 
entirely, yet few seemed to notice. The first vacancies occurred 
in James Madisons presidency, when his first-term Vice 
President George Clinton died in 1812 and his second-term Vice 
President Elbridge Gerry died in 1814. Under the Philadelphia 
Constitution, no mechanism existed to fill a vice-presidential 
vacancyyet another signal of the low status of the office in 
early America. 
But at critical moments in American history when 
presidents died or became disabled, the cracks in the Founders 
Constitution became visible. The relevant constitutional text of 
Article II, Section 1 provided that In Case of the Removal of the 
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to 
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same 
shall devolve on the Vice President . . . . Did the Same mean 
the office itself, or merely the powers and duties of the office? 
If the former was the case, an ascending Vice President was 
entitled to the honorific title of President. More importantly, if 
an ascending Vice President indeed became President rather 
than just assuming presidential powers and duties, he could 
claim a Presidents salary, which was both higher than a Vice 
Presidents and also immune from congressional tampering 
under the rules of Article II. In turn, such immunity would 
enable him to wield the veto pen and other executive powers with 
greater independence from the Legislature than would be the 
case if he were beholden to Congress for his very bread. 
Unsurprisingly, Tyler ultimately resolved the constitutional 
ambiguity in his own favor, claiming that he was indeed the 
President, and not simply the Vice President acting as President. 
Following Tyler, later vice presidents regularly proclaimed 
themselves presidents upon the deaths of their running mates, 
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with Millard Filmore replacing Zachary Taylor in 1850 and 
Andrew Johnson succeeding Abraham Lincoln in 1865. 
When the elected President died, and died quicklyas did 
Harrison, Taylor, and Lincolnlittle beyond title and salary 
turned on whether a Vice President actually became President. 
But the next presidential death highlighted more troubling 
constitutional ambiguities. In 1881, James Garfield was shot by a 
dissatisfied office-seeker, then lingered for months, waxing and 
waning in bed. Meanwhile the nation drifted, leaderless. 
Why didnt Vice President Chester A. Arthur step in, given 
that the President was obviously disabled? Partly because of 
questions raised by the Tyler precedent: If Arthur had assumed 
the duties of the presidency, would he thereby become President 
under the Tyler precedent? Suppose Garfield later recovered, as 
for a time seemed likely. If Arthur had already become President, 
would Garfield be out of luck (and out of a job)? If so, Arthur 
would have in effect staged a coup, and permanently ousted 
Garfield. 
Moreover, Article II, Section 2 neglected to specify who 
should decide whether presidential inability existed. Garfield 
alone? Arthur alone? The Cabinet? The Congress? The Supreme 
Court? 
Muddying the matter further, Garfield and Arthur came 
from opposite wings of the Republican Party. Garfield seemed to 
smile upon a professional civil service, while Arthur was a 
Republican stalwart who favored rewarding the party faithful 
with government jobs. Garfield paid dearly for his perceived 
views. Upon arrest, Garfields assassin blurted out, I did it and 
will go to jail for it. I am a Stalwart, and Arthur will be 
President. In his pockets, police found a letter addressed To the 
White House proclaiming Garfields death a sad . . . political 
necessity to unite the Republican party, and a letter addressed 
to Arthur making various recommendations for Cabinet 
reshuffling. 
Although Arthur of course had no ties to this madman, had 
the Vice President attempted to swoop into power, this might 
indeed have looked like a coup détat to America and the world. 
So Arthur did nothing, and months dragged on with the country 
effectively without a President. Garfield eventually died, and 
under the Tyler precedent, Arthur then became President. 
A similar situation arose in 1919, when Woodrow Wilson 
suffered a series of strokes that left him practically 
incapacitated. Once again, the Vice President hung back, in part 
because of the uncertainty created by the Tyler and Garfield 
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precedents. Once again, the nation endured months without an 
executive in charge. 
But in an age of nuclear weaponryand now, global 
terrorismAmerica can ill afford to be leaderless for long, or to 
have unclear rules about who is in charge. The Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, proposed and ratified after JFKs assassination, 
fills many of the gaps left open by the Founders. 
For starters, the Amendment makes clear that when the 
President dies or resigns or is removed from office, thenand 
only thenthe Vice President does in fact become President. 
Otherwise, if the President is merely disabled (perhaps only 
temporarily) from exercising the powers and duties of his office, 
then the Vice President may step in and assume the powers and 
duties of the office as Acting President without prejudice to the 
Presidents ability to resume his post if and when he has 
recovered from his disability. That is exactly what Cheney did 
when Bush was under anesthesia. 
The Amendment also provides a clear framework for 
determining whether the President is in fact disabled, and for 
how long. This framework specifies the precise roles of the 
President, the Vice President, the Cabinet, and the Congress in 
resolving questions about possible disability. The Amendment 
also authorizes Congress, by statute, to involve physicians and 
other experts in the disability-determination process. 
Yet another provision of the Amendment allows a President, 
with congressional approval, to fill a vice-presidential vacancy. 
Through this Amendment, Richard Nixon named Gerald Ford to 
the vice presidency when Spiro Agnew left office in 1973, and 
Ford in turn appointed Nelson Rockefeller in 1974 when Ford 
himself became President upon Nixons resignation. 
Even the Twenty-fifth Amendment, however, leaves some 
vital issues unaddressed. For example, it provides no satisfactory 
mechanism for determining vice-presidential disability. Given 
the health problems that many of Americas vice presidents have 
historically facedindeed, given the troubled medical history of 
Cheney himselfthis is a serious omission. Compounding the 
problem, if the Vice President ever were to be disabled (or if the 
vice presidency were at any point vacant) the Twenty-fifth 
Amendments elaborate machinery for determining presidential 
disability will seize up; much of the key decisionmaking under 
this Amendment pivots on determinations that must be 
personally made by the Vice President. Also, the Amendment 
fails to address certain problems that arise if death or disability 
occurs after a presidential election but before Inauguration Day. 
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These flaws could probably be fixed by a simple federal 
statute, but thus far Congress has ignored these issues. History 
suggests that Americans are slow to imagine the unimaginable
even after it happensand slower still to repair visible defects in 
our legal regime of presidential selection and succession. 
*  *  * 
And here is Part II, posted on September 6, 2002:23 
September presents haunting reminders that bad things 
sometimes happen to good people and a great nation. One 
hundred and one years ago today, William McKinley was shot by 
a politically motivated assassin. McKinley died several days 
later, on September 14, 1901. In mid-September 1881, President 
James Garfield also died from gunshot wounds inflicted by a 
politically motivated assassin. And then of course there is the 
date that will live in infamy, September 11, 2001. 
America cannot always prevent tragedy, but America often 
can, with relative ease, minimize the constitutional damage 
resulting from political assassins and the like. Yet the countrys 
current legal framework is notably flaweda series of 
constitutional accidents waiting to happen, and in some cases 
waiting to happen again. In this column, we shall briefly 
catalogue some of the problems that can occur and some simple 
nonpartisan solutions that lawmakers should adopt nowbefore 
tragedy strikes again. 
The Twenty-fifth Amendment, adopted after JFKs 
assassination, provides a detailed framework for determining 
whether the President is so severely disabled as to justify 
allowing someone else to act as President for the duration of the 
disability. But the Amendment says nothing about possible vice-
presidential disability, and federal statutes are likewise silent on 
the topic. 
Suppose, for example, that the Vice President is in a coma, 
whether from natural causes or because of some attempted 
assassination. Current law offers no framework for determining 
that the Vice President is disabled and therefore unfit for the job 
until he recovers, and in the absence of such a framework he 
formally retains all the powers and duties of his office. Nor does 
current law allow someone other than the Vice President or 
President to initiate determinations of presidential disability. 
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These legal gaps yield several scenarios of needless 
vulnerability. First, there is the problem of vice-presidential 
disability/presidential death. If the Vice President is not fit to 
take over, but there is no proper legal mechanism for making this 
determination while he is Vice President, then what happens if 
the President dieswhether because of some assassination or 
political terrorism, or from natural causes? The comatose Vice 
President would now become the comatose President. 
Even worse, in this scenario there is no statutory or 
constitutional framework in place to determine his unfitness as 
President! Unless a President voluntarily steps aside (which is 
unlikely if he is comatose), the only constitutional or statutory 
mechanism now in place to establish that a President is disabled 
is triggered by the Vice President. But in the vice-presidential 
disability/presidential death scenario, there is no longer any Vice 
President in office. 
Similar problems arise under a vice-presidential 
disability/presidential disability scenario. Imagine that the Vice 
President is comatose, and the President does not die, but 
himself becomes severely disabledwhether from some terrorist 
incident or from natural causes. Here too, the problem is that 
current law requires that (unless the President himself 
voluntarily steps aside) the Vice President initiate the machinery 
for determining presidential disability. Thus, if the Vice 
President is himself disabled, the machinery simply freezes up, 
and there is no clearly established legal framework for 
determining presidential disability. 
Consider also a related scenario involving a disabled Acting 
President, in which a President becomes disabled first, and a fit 
Vice President steps up to assume the role of Acting President. If 
that Acting President later becomes disabled or arguably 
disabled, who could trigger the process of making the disability 
determination? 
Now consider two vice-presidential vacancy scenarios: Either 
the Vice President has died, and has not yet been replacedor 
the President has died, and the former Vice President has 
become President but not yet installed his new Vice President. In 
these scenarios, there is once again no Vice President in place to 
trigger the disability-determination process in the event the 
President suffers some serious physical or mental setback. 
Although the Twenty-fifth Amendment nowhere addresses 
these scenarios, neither does it preclude a congressional statute 
that would solve these problems. Indeed, other language in the 
Constitutionin Article IIinvites Congress by law to provide 
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for cases of presidential and vice-presidential death and 
disability. In the event both President and Vice President have 
died or become disabled, Article II gives Congress power to decide 
by law what Officer should act as President. At least two 
questions arise: Who should be that officer? And, in the event of 
double death, how long should that officer serve? 
The presidential succession statute currently in place, 
enacted in 1947, answers these two questions, but gets both 
answers wrong, and indeed gives a plainly unconstitutional 
answer to the first questionthe who question.24 According to 
the Act, in the event of a double death, the Speaker of the House 
becomes President. The line of succession continues with the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and then members of the 
Cabinet, beginning with the Secretary of State. The Act also 
specifies that the successor President serves out the remainder of 
the deceased Presidents term. 
But as James Madison argued in 1792, congressional 
legislators are not officers of the United States, as the Article II 
statutory Succession Clause uses the word. In the Constitution, 
officers generally means executive and judicial officials, not 
legislators. (Otherwise the Article I, Section 6 rule that no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a 
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office would 
be incoherent.) 
In particular, the Article II statutory Succession Clause 
envisioned that a Cabinet secretary handpicked by the President 
himself would substitute in the sad event of double death or 
double disability. This rule of Cabinet succession (which was in 
place for sixty years before Congress changed the law in 1947) 
helps maximize the policy continuity between the President that 
Americans voted for on Election Day and the statutory successor 
who ends up taking his place. 
In sum, Article II empowers Congress to choose which 
Cabinet position is next in line, but it does not empower 
Congress to choose one of its own members instead. Thus, if the 
American people voted for a Republican presidential ticket, they 
should not end up with a Democratic statutory successor 
President, and vice versa. (We first criticized the 1947 law in 
1995 when the Democrats controlled the presidency and 
Republican Newt Gingrich stood next in line as Speaker of the 
House. But we feel the same way about the issue today, when 
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the White House is controlled by the Republicans and when 
Democrat Richard Gephardt would be Speaker of the House if 
the Democrats win a few more seats in the upcoming off-year 
election.) 
Because no Cabinet secretary enjoys a personal mandate 
from a national electorate nor do congressional leaders picked 
within individual states and districts, the Cabinet successor who 
takes over in the event of double death should serve only as long 
as is necessary to arrange a special off-year presidential election 
to choose someone to finish the term. That way, the nation 
spends as little time as possible with a President lacking a 
personal national electoral mandate. 
If personal mandates from the American people are 
important, isnt there something odd about Americas current 
system of choosing vice presidents? After all, voters often pay 
little attention to the bottom of the ticket. According to exit polls, 
America has at times elected vice presidents who could never 
have won the vice presidency, to say nothing of the presidency, 
head to head against their leading opponent. 
If people vote for a presidential ticket despite the vice-
presidential candidate, then what would that Vice Presidents 
mandate be were he to become President after a terrorist 
incident or otherwise? Why should the American people be led by 
a President who never did, and perhaps never could, win the 
support of the national people? (Remember Dan Quayle?) 
One way to strengthen the Vice Presidents personal 
mandate would be to allow voters to vote separately for President 
and Vice President, just as many states allow separate votes for 
Governors and Lieutenant Governors. Nothing in the Constitution 
prevents states from giving voters this option, but it does raise 
several complexities.25 
Here is yet another problem: Suppose a President-elect were 
to die between Election Day and Inauguration Day. Shouldnt the 
Vice President-elect automatically become President on 
Inauguration Day? 
If the death occurs after Congress has counted the Electoral 
College votes, this is precisely what would happen under the 
Twentieth Amendment. But suppose the death occurs, whether 
naturally or because of terrorism, hours before the meeting of the 
Electoral College? Too unlikely ever to actually happen? Not at 
all. Consider that in 1872, presidential candidate Horace Greeley 
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died after the election but before the Electoral College met. Some 
electors nevertheless voted for Greeley, and Congress refused to 
count these electoral votes. Nothing much turned on that 
decisionGreeley had lost to Ulysses Grant, anyway. 
But now suppose the candidate who won the November 
election died right before the Electoral College met, and that 
some of the Electoral College nevertheless voted for him
perhaps because college members had pledged to do so, or 
because state law purported to bind them, or because they had 
little time to process the tragedy and consider their other options. 
If Congress applied the Greeley precedent, then all these 
electoral votes would be tossed aside, and the candidate who lost 
the election might well become the President. 
But what if the death occurred shortly before Election Day? 
Again, this is no abstract hypothetical. In Americas last general 
election, the Democratic U.S. Senate candidate from Missouri, 
Mel Carnahan, died in a plane crash in late October, just weeks 
before the voters went to the polls. 
The 1968 assassination of presidential candidate Robert F. 
Kennedy reminds us that terrorism compounds the risks run by 
candidates. (Indeed, future historians may well look back at 
RFKs assassination as an eerie precursor to more recent acts of 
terror in the heartland; Kennedy was felled by a gunman from 
the Middle East, apparently because of the candidates 
commitment to Israel.) 
What if Kennedy had been assassinated not hours after the 
California primary in June 1968 but hours before the general 
election in November 1968? In the wake of massive grief and 
confusion, what kind of election would this have been, with 
millions of voters unsure whether their votes for a dead 
candidate would even count, or how? 
One solution would allow for an election to be postponed in 
certain disastrous circumstances. For example, Congress could 
provide that if a major party presidential candidate were to die or 
become incapacitated (as certified by, say, the Chief Justice of the 
United States) shortly before Election Day, the presidential 
election should be postponeda few weeks should sufficein 
order to allow the system to regroup and field a new ticket, and 
to allow the states to reprint ballots. 
If election postponement might make sense in the case of the 
death of a candidate, it might likewise make sense in other types 
of national emergency or mass terrorism. Recall that September 
11, 2001, was a scheduled election day in New York, the day the 
parties were supposed to elect their mayoral candidates. But 
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when tragedy struck, the primary was postponed, as state law 
allowed it to be. 
If, God forbid, a similar event were to happen on or near the 
national Election Daytimed, perhaps, in an attempt to 
undermine the functioning of American democracythere ought 
to be a similar mechanism for postponing the election until the 
nation gets back on its feet. But current federal law does not 
provide for such a mechanism. 
All of our suggestions today raise important issues of 
principle and detail. Some readers will doubtless find our 
proposed solutions imperfect, or worse. Perhaps some readers 
may have better solutions. But the time for citizens and 
policymakers to start discussing these issues is now, before 
tragedy strikes again and does needless damage to American 
democracy. 
*  *  * 
Although Washington, D.C., did not seem in any hurry to 
enact reform along the lines I had proposed, Hollywood was 
paying closer attention and chose to “enact” some of my ideas in a 
somewhat different fashion—by acting them out in a fictional 
drama. During the summer and fall of 2003, the screenwriters of 
the hit NBC series The West Wing teed up the issue of 
presidential succession in their inimitably gripping way—and the 
moment was yet again ripe for serious discussion. In part because 
of this hit series, the Washington Post took renewed interest in 
the matter and two committees of the U.S. Senate even scheduled 
a joint hearing to ponder the topic. Thank you, President 
Bartlet! 
Here is what I wrote in the Washington Post on September 
14, 2003:26 
Life and art (or at least television) converge this month as 
both the U.S. Senate and NBCs The West Wing focus on 
Americas bizarre presidential succession rules. 
On Wednesday, September 24, fans of the fictional President 
Josiah Jed Bartlet will learn whether he regains his office 
after having temporarily abandoned it. At the end of last 
season, terrorists kidnapped Bartlets daughter, exposing him 
and the country to possible political extortion. With his Vice 
President having recently resigned, Bartlet, a staunch Democrat, 
found himself obliged for the good of the nation to hand over 
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power to the Republican Speaker of the House, played by John 
Goodman. 
Now flash back to the real world. On Tuesday, the Senate 
will hold hearings to consider whether our law should indeed put 
the Speaker in the West Wing if both the President and Vice 
President resigned, died, or became disabled. Of course, such a 
double disaster is a low-probability eventbut then, so was the 
electoral train wreck of 2000. Wise lawmakers must plan for 
highly destabilizing contingenciesearthquakes, blackouts, 
voting machine foul-ups, terror attacks, assassinationsbefore 
they happen. This weeks hearings are part of a broader process 
of post-9/11 reassessment now underway, aimed at maximizing 
continuity of government in the event of crisis. 
The proper starting point for planning is the Constitution, 
which says that if both the President and the Vice President are 
unavailable, presidential power should flow to some other federal 
Officer named by law. The Framers clearly had in mind a 
Cabinet officerpresumably, one who had been picked by the 
President himself before tragedy struck. In fact, no less an 
authority than James Madison insisted that the constitutionally 
mandated separation of executive and legislative powers made 
congressional leaders ineligible.27 Yet the current succession 
statute, enacted in 1947, puts the Speaker of the House and then 
the President pro tempore of the Senatehistorically the 
majority partys most senior senator, who presides over the 
Senate in the Vice Presidents absenceahead of Cabinet officers, 
in plain disregard of Madisons careful constitutional analysis. 
In truth, 1947 was not the first time Congress chose to 
ignore Madison. In the early years of George Washingtons 
presidency, then-congressman Madisons argument for Cabinet 
succession stumbled into a political minefield. Which Cabinet 
position should head the list? Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson thought his office deserved top billing, but Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton had other ideas. Eventually, in 
1792, Congress detoured around the minefield by placing the 
President pro tempore of the Senate at the top of the line of 
succession, followed by the Speaker of the House. Though the 
1947 law flips this order, it suffers from the same constitutional 
flaws that Madison identified two centuries ago. 
Constitutionality aside, the 1947 law defies common sense. 
Suppose that a President is not dead but briefly disabled, and the 
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Vice President is also unavailable, for whatever reason. Because 
separation-of-powers principles prohibit a sitting legislator from 
serving even temporarily in the executive branch, the statute 
says that a Speaker of the House must quit Congress before 
moving into the Oval Office, as happened on The West Wing. But 
if the disabled President then recovers and reclaims power, the 
former Speaker will have no job to return to. That hardly seems a 
fitting reward for faithful public service in a crisis. A more 
sensible law would let a Cabinet officer step up for the duration 
of the disability and then step down whenever the President 
recovered. 
In another wrinkle, the 1947 law allows the Speaker to play 
an ugly wait-and-see game. If he thinks a disability will not last 
longand, again, if the Vice President is out of the picturehe 
can allow a Cabinet officer to act as President. If the disability 
then worsens, the Speaker can, with a snap of his fingers, bump 
the Cabinet secretary out of the Oval Office and put himself in. 
But bumping would only encourage political gamesmanship, 
weaken the presidency itself, and increase instability at a 
moment when tranquility should be the nations top priority. 
Current law may even encourage a more disruptive sort of 
bumping. Whenever legislative leaders help impeach and remove 
the President or Vice President, they themselves move up one 
notch in the succession order. Might this conflict of interest 
compromise their roles as impeachment judges and jurors? 
In fact, when President Andrew Johnson was impeached in 
1868, Senate leader Ben Wade stood at the top of the succession 
list, thanks to the 1792 law. (There was no Vice President in 
1868; Johnson himself had been elected to this post in 1864 but 
left it vacant when he became President upon Lincolns 
assassination in 1865.) Even as Wade sat in supposedly impartial 
judgment over Johnson, he had already begun making plans to 
move into the White House. Though Johnson ultimately was 
acquitted, the Wade affair prompted reformers in 1886 to remove 
all legislative leaders from the line of succession. But in 1947, the 
lessons of 1868 were forgotten, and legislators returned to the top 
of the succession list. 
Other conflicts of interest under the current law arise when 
a President seeks to fill a vacant number two spot by nominating 
a new Vice President to be confirmed by Congress. Such 
vacancies should be filled quickly, but the statute gives 
congressional leaders perverse incentives to delay confirmation. 
In 1974, it took a Democratic Congress four months to confirm 
Republican President Gerald Fords nominee, Nelson A. 
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Rockefeller. Had something happened to Ford in the meantime, 
Democratic Speaker Carl Albert would have assumed power. 
Which highlights perhaps the biggest problem: If Americans 
elect a President of one party, why should we get stuck with a 
President of the opposite partyperhaps (as in the fictional The 
West Wing) a sworn foe of the person we chose? Cabinet 
succession would avoid this oddity. 
Supporters of the 1947 law say that presidential powers 
should go to an elected leader, not an appointed underling. But 
congressmen are elected locally, not nationally. Legislators often 
lack the national vision that characterizes the President and his 
Cabinet team. Historically, only one Speaker of the House, James 
K. Polk, has ever been elected President, compared with six 
secretaries of state. 
Some have suggested that, if existing Cabinet slots are 
deemed unsuitable to head the succession list, Congress could 
create a new Cabinet post of Second or Assistant Vice 
President, to be nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate in a high-visibility process. This officers sole 
responsibilities would be to receive regular briefings preparing 
him or her to serve at a moments notice and to lie low until 
needed: in the line of succession but out of the line of fire. The 
democratic mandate of this Assistant Vice President might be 
further enhanced if presidential candidates announced their 
prospective nominees for the job well before the November 
election. In casting ballots for their preferred presidential 
candidate, American voters would also be endorsing that 
candidates announced succession team. 
If the proposed Assistant Vice Presidents job description 
seems rather quirkydoing almost nothing while remaining 
ready to do everythingthis is of course also true of the vice 
presidency itself. And because, despite every precaution, mishap 
might befall the Assistant Vice President, a new statute would, 
like the current one, need to put existing Cabinet officers on the 
next rungs of the succession ladder. 
However the details are resolved, America needs to address 
the anomalies in the current law and to do it quickly. At present, 
any shift from congressional to Cabinet succession would be a 
partisan washfrom one set of Republicans to another. But if a 
divided government returns after the 2004 elections, reform will 
be much harder to achieve. Although any statutory fix will come 
too late to help President Bartlet next week, now is the perfect 
time to enact reforms that might assist President Bush and his 
successors in the real West Wing. 
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*  *  * 
And here is my September 16, 2003, testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, in which various Twenty-fifth Amendment 
arguments that appeared only fleetingly in my Washington Post 
piece were given greater prominence:28 
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is Akhil Reed Amar. I am 
the Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale 
University, and have been writing about the topic of presidential 
succession for over a decade. In February 1994, I offered 
testimony on this topic to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
the Constitution, and I am grateful for the opportunity to appear 
again today. As my testimony draws upon several articles that I 
have written on the subject, I respectfully request that these 
articles be made part of the record. 
The current presidential succession act, section 19 of title 3, 
United States Code, is in my view a disastrous statute, an 
accident waiting to happen. It should be repealed and replaced. I 
will summarize its main problems and then outline my proposed 
alternative. 
First, Section 19 violates the Constitutions Succession 
Clause, Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, which authorizes Congress 
to name an Officer to act as President in the event that both 
President and Vice President are unavailable. House and Senate 
leaders are not Officers within the meaning of the Succession 
Clause.29 Rather, the Framers clearly contemplated that a 
Cabinet officer would be named as Acting President. This is not 
merely my personal reading of Article II. It is also James 
Madisons view, which he expressed forcefully while a 
congressman in 1792.30 
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Second, the Acts bumping provision, Section 19(d)(2), 
constitutes an independent violation of the Succession Clause, 
which says that the Officer named by Congress shall act as 
President . . . until the [presidential or vice-presidential] 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. Section 
19(d)(2) instead says, in effect, that the successor officer shall act 
as President until some other suitor wants the job. Bumping 
weakens the presidency itself and increases instability and 
uncertainty at the very moment when the nation is most in need 
of tranquility. 
Even if I were wrong about these constitutional claims, they 
are nevertheless substantial ones. The first point, to repeat, 
comes directly from James Madison, father of the Constitution, 
who helped draft the Succession Clause. Over the last decade, 
many citizens and scholars from across the ideological spectrum 
have told me that they agree with Madison, and with me, about 
the constitutional questions involved. If, God forbid, America 
were ever to lose both her President and Vice President, even 
temporarily, the succession law in place should provide 
unquestioned legitimacy to the Officer who must then act as 
President. With so large a constitutional cloud hanging over it, 
Section 19 fails to provide this desired level of legitimacy. 
In addition to these constitutional objections, there are many 
policy problems with Section 19. First, Section 19s requirement 
that an Acting President resign his previous post makes this law 
an awkward instrument in situations of temporary disability. Its 
rules run counter to the approach of the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, which facilitates smooth handoffs of power back 
and forth in situations of short-term disabilityscheduled 
surgery, for example. Second, Section 19 creates a variety of 
perverse incentives and conflicts of interest, warping the 
Congresss proper role in impeachments and in confirmations of 
vice-presidential nominees under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
Third, Section 19 can upend the results of a presidential election. 
If Americans elect party A to the White House, why should we 
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end up with party B? Here, too, Section 19 is in serious tension 
with the better approach embodied in the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, which enables a President to pick his successor and 
thereby promotes executive party continuity. Fourth, Section 19 
provides no mechanism for addressing arguable vice-presidential 
disabilities, or for determining presidential disability in the event 
the Vice President is dead or disabled. These are especially 
troubling omissions because of the indispensable role that the 
Vice President needs to play under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
Fifth, Section 19 fails to deal with certain windows of special 
vulnerability immediately before and after presidential 
elections.31 
In short, Section 19 violates Article II and is out of sync with 
the basic spirit and structure of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 
which became part of our Constitution two decades after Section 
19 was enacted. 
The main argument against Cabinet succession is that 
presidential powers should go to an elected leader, not an 
appointed underling. But the Twenty-fifth Amendment offers an 
attractive alternative model of handpicked succession: from 
Nixon to Ford to Rockefeller, with a President naming the person 
who will fill in for him and complete his term if he is unable to do 
so himself. The Twenty-fifth Amendment does not give a 
President carte blanche; it provides for a special confirmation 
process to vet the Presidents nominee, and confirmation in that 
special process confers added legitimacy upon that nominee. 
If the Twenty-fifth Amendment reflects the best approach to 
sequential double vacancywhere first one of the top two officers 
becomes unavailable, and then the othera closely analogous 
approach should be used in the event of a simultaneous double 
vacancy. Congress could create a new Cabinet post of Assistant 
Vice President, to be nominated by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate in a high-visibility process. This officers sole 
responsibilities would be to receive regular briefings preparing 
him or her to serve at a moments notice and to lie low until 
needed: in the line of succession but out of the line of fire. The 
democratic mandate of this Assistant Vice President might be 
further enhanced if presidential candidates announced their 
prospective nominees for this third-in-line job well before the 
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November election. In casting ballots for their preferred 
presidential candidate, American voters would also be endorsing 
that candidates announced succession team of Vice President 
and Assistant Vice President. Cabinet officers should follow the 
Assistant Vice President in the longer line of succession. 
This solution solves the constitutional problems I identified: 
The new Assistant Vice President would clearly be an Officer 
and bumping would be eliminated. The solution also solves the 
practical problems. No resignations would be requiredpower 
could flow smoothly back and forth in situations of temporary 
disability. Congressional conflicts of interest would be avoided. 
Party and policy continuity within the executive branch would be 
preserved. And the process by which the American electorate and 
then the Senate endorsed any individual Assistant Vice 
President would confer the desired democratic legitimacy on this 
officer, bolstering his or her mandate to lead in a crisis. 
The two additional issues I have raised todayvice-
presidential disability and windows of special vulnerability at 
election timealso have clean solutions, as explained in my 1994 
testimony.32 Thank you. 
*  *  * 
For an academic, anything worth publishing is worth 
publishing twice—as this Address itself evidences. One year after 
my Senate testimony, the Constitution Subcommittee of the House 
Judiciary Committee solicited my testimony on presidential 
succession issues, and I largely repeated verbatim my earlier 
statement to the Senate. In one particular, however, I 
backpedalled. Some senators had balked at the idea of creating a 
new position of Assistant Vice President. I rather liked the idea, 
for it seemed to take supreme advantage of specialization of labor: 
Pick the one person—perhaps even a former President—who could 
be the best able to take charge in the extremely unlikely and 
wholly unprecedented situation of simultaneous double death or 
double disability. At this moment, the nation and the world would 
be reeling, and we all would benefit from the soothing presence of 
a figure who understood the job of the President instinctively, who 
had all the major world leaders already on his speed-dial, and 
who had been in effect pre-approved by the American electorate 
during the presidential campaign itself. Just as a baseball team 
might, at a critical moment, need a left-handed strikeout ace who 
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is able to get one key batter out in the ninth inning—and thereby 
win Game Seven of the World Series—so might the nation need a 
player who would come in from the dugout to save the day in a 
moment of crisis. But not everyone loves the specialty player—the 
pinch hitter, the pinch runner, the “closer.” Many purists still 
object to the designated hitter. So in my House testimony of 
October 6, 2004, I modified my earlier testimony as follows: 
Essentially, there are two plausible options. Under one 
option, Congress could create a new cabinet post of 
Assistant Vice President, to be nominated by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate in a high-visibility process. . . . 
If this option were deemed undesirable, Congress could 
avoid creating a new position of Assistant Vice President, 
and instead simply designate the Secretary of State, or any 
other top Cabinet position, first in the line of succession 
after the Vice President.33 
*  *  * 
In case any of you missed it, there was yet another interesting 
presidential election a while ago. During the 2008 primary 
season, my thoughts once again turned to the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment. The careful observer will note several familiar 
aspects of my latest idea. As in my 1999 New Republic essay, I 
envision using Section 3 of the Amendment beyond physical and 
mental disabilities, to encompass political disabilities—even self-
imposed ones. As in my 2000 Slate posting, I wonder whether 
clever politicians could use Section 2 of the Amendment to in effect 
“flip the ticket” by allowing the President and Vice President to 
trade places. As in my 2003 Senate testimony and 2004 House 
testimony, I seek to enhance democratic legitimacy by using 
presidential elections to secure a popular vote of confidence for 
various schemes of presidential succession. And as in 1999, I 
wonder whether creative use of the Amendment may enable a true 
presidential-vice-presidential team to leverage the benefits of joint 
incumbency to stretch out the incumbency advantage from two 
terms to four terms.  
Here is what I posted in Slate on March 21, 2008:34 
When Hillary Clinton recently floated the idea of choosing 
Barack Obama as her running mate, she won political points 
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without being taken seriously (especially by Obama). The 
primary season has turned into the kind of slog and slugfest that 
makes opponents more opposed to each other, not less. But 
humor me, for a moment, and imagine that the kind of 
reconciliation that would allow them to be running mates is 
possible. Not to mention the best outcome for the party. 
But which should it be: ClintonObama or ObamaClinton? 
In fact, voters in November could actually endorse both versions 
of the tickettruly, two Presidents for the price of one. How? The 
Constitutions Twenty-fifth Amendment allows for a new 
paradigm of political teamwork: The two Democratic candidates 
could publicly agree to take turns in the top slot. 
Adopted in 1967, in the shadow of John F. Kennedys 
assassination, the Twenty-fifth Amendment allows Presidents 
unilaterally to transfer presidential power to their Vice 
Presidents and enables Presidents, with congressional consent, to 
fill a vacancy in the vice presidency should one arise. By 
creatively using the constitutional rules created by this 
Amendment, the Democrats can, if they are so inclined, present 
the voters in November with a new kind of balanced ticket. 
Heres how it would work: In August at the Democratic 
National Convention, the party would nominate one candidate 
for President and the other for Vice President in the time-
honored way. In their acceptance speeches, the nominees would 
announce that they intend to alternate. For example, they could 
tell the voters that the person heading the Democratic ticket 
would, if elected, take office in January 2009 but would serve as 
President for only the first three years of the four-year term. In 
January 2012, the teammates would use the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment to switch places, and the person elected Vice 
President would assume the presidency for the final year of 
the term. There is nothing magical about these dates. Almost 
any date would do. For maximal democratic legitimacy, 
however, the candidates should inform the voters before the 
election of the specific date when their planned shift of power 
will occur. 
Of course, if this dream team proved popular in office, the 
teammates could run for reelection in 2012. This time, it might 
make the most sense for the ticket to be the inverse of 2008. 
Thus, the person at the bottom of the 2008 ticket could top the 
2012 ticket. If reelected, our initial-Vice-President-turned-
President might then serve until, say, January 2016four 
consecutive years in alland then our initial-President-turned-
Vice-President would resume the top spot for the final year of the 
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second term. (Thus, this person, too, would end up serving four 
years, albeit not consecutively.) 
And heres the icing on the constitutional cake: Nothing in 
the Twenty-fifth Amendment or elsewhere in the founding 
document would prevent this team from presenting themselves to 
the electorate in similar fashion in 2016. If the voters were to 
endorse the pair yet again, then at this point one of the 
teammates would have been elected twice as President and 
would become ineligible in any future presidential race, but the 
other teammate would in fact remain fully eligible to run in 2020. 
With the result that, if voters so chose, the teammates could, 
between themselves, share power for a total of four full terms. 
(Under the Twenty-second Amendment, no person can be elected 
to the presidency more than twice, and under the Twelfth 
Amendment, Vice Presidents must meet the same eligibility and 
electability rules as Presidents.) 
Ticket-flipping, then, provides a brilliant way for the 
Democrats to leverage the advantages of incumbency after 2009 
so as to stretch their potential presidential tenure over the 
ensuing sixteen years rather than the standard eight. The 
arrangement requires two strong candidates, each of whom is 
very plausibly presidential and each of whom has a large and 
intense political base, whose enthusiasm would be needed to 
assure success in the general election. This year the Democrats 
are blessed with two such powerhouses. 
Which of the two candidates should top the ticket in 2008? 
Whoever ends up with more delegates at the convention. But if 
the two can privatelyor even publiclyagree now to run as a 
true team in the general election, both will have ironclad 
incentives to play nice in the remaining primaries and caucuses 
and at the convention itself.35 Each will want to head the ticket, 
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candidates besides incumbent presidents to have actually won the presidency 
were fresh facesthat is, candidates running for the presidency for the first 
time. Democrats love fresh facesJFK in 1960, Jimmy Carter in 1976, Bill 
Clinton in 1992. Prominent non-incumbent Democrats on their second or third 
tries for the presidency have either failed to get the nominationlike Hubert 
Humphrey in 1972, Jerry Brown in 1992, and John Edwards this yearor lost 
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but because the person on the bottom will also become President 
if the pair wins in November, competition for the top spot will be 
far less likely to spiral out of control in the turbulent weeks and 
months ahead. And so for the party, the benefits are manifold: A 
dream-team, turn-taking ticket would ensure that the Democrats 
two most popular leaders and their supporters behave themselves 
and then truly unite. Moreover, the policy differences between 
Clinton and Obama are so tiny that it would be perfectly 
principled to tell voters that the ticket will flip at some specified 
post-inaugural date. 
Exactly how does the Constitution enable a sitting President 
and Vice President to trade places? Whenever a President 
resigns, the Vice President automatically becomes President, as 
when Richard Nixon stepped down and thus made Gerald Ford 
President in 1974. Under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the new 
President, in turn, picks a new Vice President, subject to 
congressional approval. President Ford picked Nelson Rockefeller 
to be his Vice President, and Congress said yes. Heres the twist: 
The Twenty-fifth Amendment would allow the new President to 
pick the old President as the new Vice President. Voilathe 
ticket, flipped! As long as the Congress approves, the Twenty-
fifth Amendment would thus enable the President and Vice 
                                                          
in the general election, like Adlai Stevenson in 1956, Humphrey in 1968, and Al 
Gore in 2000. Presidential competition within the Democratic Party is thus 
especially fierce because each candidate realizes that, most likely, it is now or 
never. (Competition among Republicans, by contrast, is generally tamer because 
the GOP loves political encores and is better at electing decidedly unfresh faces. 
Several Republicans have won the top prize on their second or third try
Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and the first George Bush, for example. McCain 
hopes to join their ranks this year.) 
Alternatively, if Clinton heads up an Obama-less ticket this year and beats 
McCain, Obamas chances of making it to the presidency would become even 
worse. Challenging a Democratic incumbent in 2012 would be an uphill battle, 
so Obama would probably need to wait at least until 2016, at which point he 
could very well face stiff party competition from whomever Clinton picks as her 
running mate. The fact that Obamas presidential prospects would be worse if 
Clinton were to win on her own than if she were to lose to McCain highlights 
another tactical truth: Even if Clinton has the votes at the convention to prevail 
and the power to pick someone other than Obama as her running mate, it might 
be unwise to do so, given that Obama might have diminished incentives to 
deliver his ground troops for her come November. 
Of course, everything in this analysis is symmetrical: We could switch the 
names Obama and Clinton in the preceding paragraphs and the points would be 
equally valid. A half-loaf for Clinton is better than none; and if Obama ends up 
on top of a Clinton-less ticket, she loses her own best chance ever to become 
president. Most important, were Obama to run without Clinton, she might 
actually be better off if he were to lose the general election to McCain; and this, 
in turn, gives him a good tactical reason to put her on the ticket, so that she and 
her most ardent supporters have the proper incentives. 
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President to switch seats in a nimble transaction that could be 
completed in less than an hour. 
As a matter of democratic principle, Congress should 
approve such a deal, given that the American voters would have 
blessed it long in advance, in the presidential election itself. But 
suppose a pigheaded Congress refused to play along, for example, 
because it was controlled by Republican naysayers. No matter. 
Instead of formally resigning, a President could accomplish the 
flip on his or her own, simply by transferring presidential power 
to the Vice President under a different section of the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment that allows the President unilaterally to transform 
the Vice President into the Acting President. In 2002 and again 
in 2007, George W. Bush used this section to hand over power to 
Dick Cheney before undergoing brief anesthesia. When Bush 
recovered, he resumed the reins of power. 
To be clear: At every instant, America would have one, and 
only one, person acting as President and formally in charge. 
Handoffs of power between teammates would occur much as they 
have when incumbents traditionally leave office, as when Reagan 
yielded in 1989, at the end of his second term, to his own 
handpicked running mate, the first George Bush. The Twenty-
fifth Amendment was specially designed to facilitate easy 
transfers of power back and forth between Presidents and Vice 
Presidents. Its full potential to create a different kind of 
teamwork at the topand to launch a new kind of presidential 
election strategyhas yet to be fully appreciated. Thanks to this 
Amendment, the Democratic Party need not tear itself apart in 
trying to choose between two historic firsts. Instead, Democrats 
can offer the voters boththe first black President and the first 
woman Presidentvia the first truly balanced presidential 
ticket. 
*  *  * 
When I wrote the piece above, I did not seriously expect that 
my tag-team, ticket-flipping proposal would in fact be adopted in 
the 2008 race.36 The idea was too edgy, too novel, to be sprung on 
the citizenry near the end of the primary season, without the 
proper groundwork having been laid much earlier. But I do think 
                                                          
 36. The actual resultwith Obama as President and Hillary Clinton as Secretary of 
State was, however, not wildly at odds with the incentive analysis I offered in 
note 35, supra. Clinton did indeed end up with an important and prestigious office. If she 
had any indication from Obama prior to the convention that she would likely be given this 
position in an Obama administration, this hint or promise would have given her an added 
incentive to work extra hard for an Obama victoryespecially because she could plausibly 
imagine that her position as the top Cabinet officer might be a suitable launching pad for 
a second presidential run in 2016. 
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that some time in the foreseeable future a tag-team approach may 
well be tried because there may well come a day when a team 
would end up combining the teammates’ political positives 
without a corresponding increase in the team’s political 
negatives—with more added base than added baggage. To 
generalize the point: A turn-taking, ticket-flipping approach 
would work best whenever a political party genuinely has two 
strong candidates, each of whom is very plausibly presidential 
and each of whom has a large and intense political base whose 
enthusiasm is needed to assure success in the general election. 
I’m not predicting that my tag-team, ticket-flipping idea will 
in fact be tried within the next few elections. But stranger things 
have happened. (Take Florida, 2000.) And if something like this 
does happen in your lifetime, you can say you heard it here first—
in Houston. 
